Wellington's Command: A Reappraisal of His Generalship in the Peninsula and at Waterloo Hardcover – Import, 23 October 2019

Wellington was a great and successful general.He was autocratic and a micromanager, probably necessarily.He was a self promoter, airbrushing the Prussians out of “Waterloo” that they wanted to call “Belle Alliance “ and the Spanish out of the “Peninsular War” that they call a war of independence. Possibly harmless to British interests.He went further to denigrate foreigners, his own Generals and his own troops. In a closely argued academic study, the author examines the proposition that these traits were actually harmful and that without them his victories might have been even greater.

It is a work of scholarship. It's main contention is that Wellington (for that is what I shall refer to him as, rather than, Arthur Wellesley) and his other subsequent titles, did not treat his subordinates with the grace and charm which they deserved, and was rough, tough and bold with most of his senior officers, blaming them for the mistakes that were mostly or more often his rather than those of his subordinates. Also, that he showed a lack of tact and understanding to some who were only doing their best in difficult circumstances; that senior as well as junior officers were wrongly blamed for some mistakes, errors and lack of judgment In respect of which, those criticisms were the fault of Wellington himself.It is as though he has not read Rory Muir's book on the 'Second Son Syndrome'' in Georgian and Victorian England. This is more correctly entitled ‘Gentlemen of Uncertain Fortune’, with the subheading of ‘How Younger Sons made Their Way in Jane Austen’s England, Yale 2019. Muir’s two volumes on the Great Duke are excellent, as is his book on the 'Second Son Syndrome'. The first born got all the money, the title, the land, whereas the second son and other brothers had to struggle and make do with 'what was left on the table'.Richard Wellesley (the Duke’s Eldest brother), who succeeded his father as Earl of Mornington, was brilliant, and charming, an acclaimed and outstanding Scholar at Eton, sometime Viceroy of India and a leading figure in the Georgian politics of England, For details of his life and career, look at Wikipaedia.Arthur Wellesley, the second son, after an undistinguished career at Eton, decided on the army as his career He purchased his commission and rose rapidly in the Army. He was experienced in politics, having held serious political offices in Ireland. He gained experience as to how things could go wrong in a Campaign in The Netherlands. His promotions were rapid and he learned about command and control during his Indian Campaigns, and this was demonstrated by his coolness and performance at the ‘Battle of Assaye’. His first successes were in India, when his eldest brother was there as Viceroy for part of Wellington’ time, when he first demonstrated his skill and intrepidity.He was known to both parties in Parliament, though if Sir John Moore had not died at Corunna, I fancy he would have been senior to Wellington and would have been likely to have had the command to which Wellington succeeded. Then, there was the wretched Treaty of Cintra after Wellington’s first victories. The other two generals, both senior to Wellington went, metaphorically. to the wall and Wellington survived untainted by the imbroglio over The Cintra Treaty and the Inquiry that followed it.I have a Library of more than 300 books on the subject of the Peninsular War, and Waterloo, as well as a first edition of the Despatches, also the major works of Oman and of Napier. There has been a great explosion of books and memoirs produced and significant new material discovered by the likes of the charming Gareth Glover. We know today far more than ever was known by Oman and the new finds merely add colour and texture to the basic story.My reservations.However, the complaints and criticisms cited in this book, thorough and impeccably researched as it is, amount in my view to merely criticisms of the Duke for his handling of some of his subordinates, when he should have been more tolerant of the various failings of other men, and his lack of appreciation of his own mistakes, which, themselves, even compounded some of his own errors.Most of us, who have taken bad decisions, do not openly to confess to all and sundry, what an idiot we have made of ourselves. It is not the habit of Prime Ministers or leading military figures to openly proclaim and confess to the whole world, what an ass they may have been or actually were!There is something in the tone and style of this book of which I do not approve. It is, as I have said, impeccably researched and the writing is of a high order, but the whole left a nasty taste in my mouth. It is as though the author dislikes the Duke, which he is clearly entitled to do, but wishes, at the same time for his readers to feel equally horrified as to the Duke’s failures as a human being! I do not accept that the evidence is there to support the contention of the author. That is, of course, a matter of interpretation!I have read of the mistakes that the Duke made, elsewhere, but I do not complain of that, It is the manner in which those mistakes are described, which make me reluctant to conclude that this is an unfair way in which to deal with the Duke’s errors and failures! I disliked the tone and style of the whole book. However, I concede that the scholarship is impeccable. The charges are not made out.When he finally died, Victorian England treated his demise with all the awe, pomp and sanctity that it could manage. A ‘great man’ both as the ‘Victor of Waterloo’, the man who masterminded the Peninsular War and drove the French from Spain. He was been Prime Minister on two occasions, led the successful Campaign for Catholic Emancipation in 1829 and refused to participate in the Great Reform Act of 1832. When he finally died, the whole of London stopped to honour his life and deeds. The celebration of his passing, had not been seen before.

This gets four stars from me, for the head-on analysis of our greatest general's reputation. That's quite a challenge, and it is not quite pulled off. The "victories might have been even greater" line doesn't get us very far since we'll never know the what-ifs. Actually, what Jaycock is poking at is the 'myth' that Wellington was economical with the lives of his men on the battlefield, arguing that Wellington missed his chances to close the campaign in the Peninsula earlier. Ok maybe, but a series of competent French generals like Massena had something to say about it. Jaycock is great on Wellington's apparent lack of team-leadership but labours his criticisms of the duke's battle management. The worst he can say about Wellington at Waterloo is that "the absence of light cavalry support for the charging [Scots Greys] was a mistake." But this is wrong; the 12th and 16th Light Dragoons got into the action as quickly as they could, as a whole bunch of recent research (Gareth Glover's Waterloo Archive, John Morewood's Waterloo General, D Blackmore's excellent So Bloody a Day) makes clear. Blackmore especially gives a clear picture of how the LD regiments supported each other as well as the heavy brigades, precisely in order to avoid getting into the difficulties the disorganised heavies suffered. Maybe Blackmore's book came out too late for Jaycock.